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Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City
ofJohannesburg: Enforcing the
Right to Adequate Housing
through 'Engagement'
Brian Ray*
1. Introduction
On 19 February 2008, the South African Constitutional Court handed down
an important new decision on socio-economic rights: Occupiers of 51 Olivia
Road v City of Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg).' City of Johannesburg approved
a landmark settlement between the City of Johannesburg and residents of
several informal communities in Johannesburg who had sought to prevent
the City from evicting them as part of an inner-city regeneration project.
Rather than imposing a direct remedy, the Court instead constitutionalised
a novel 'engagement' requirement in housing rights cases. Engagement, which
requires government entities to consult with residents affected by policy deci-
sions that may involve eviction and publicly report on that process, offers
a novel and potentially powerful mechanism for enforcing socioeconomic
rights that limits court intervention in policy decisions.
City of Johannesburg began as a series of emergency applications in the
Witwatersrand High Court by the City of Johannesburg to evict over 300
people from six properties in inner-city Johannesburg. 2 The City sought these
evictions as part of broader regeneration strategy, one aspect of which was
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA
(brian. ray@law.csuohio.edu).
1 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of
Johannesburg and Others [2008] ZACC 1.
2 City oflohannesburg and Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others, 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (w) at para. 2
(City of Johannesburg High Court). See Chenwi, 'Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African
Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions', (2008)
8 Human Rights Law Review 105, which provides a thorough analysis of this litigation prior
to the Constitutional Court's final order.
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the identification, clearance and ultimate redevelopment of 'bad' buildings in
the inner-city district.3 The National Building Regulations and Building
Standards Act (NBRA),4 an apartheid-era law that grants municipalities the
power to evict tenants of any building deemed unsafe or unhealthy, provided
the legal basis for the City's emergency applications.
The residents of these buildings opposed the applications on several statu-
tory and constitutional grounds, including the claim that the City's failure to
provide access to adequate housing as required by section 26 of the South
African Constitution precluded their eviction.5 The residents also counter-
claimed, seeking, among other things, an order that the City's housing
programme failed to comply with its constitutional and statutory duties.
The residents sought a structural injunction requiring the City to comply
with these duties.
6
The residents' opposition was the result of a coordinated effort by a group of
non-profit organisations working together on a range of efforts to protect the
housing rights of poor communities throughout South Africa. Prior to the
City's eviction attempts in these cases, the Geneva-based Centre on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) published an extensive report criticising the
City's eviction programme and outlining legal and policy arguments against
that programme. 7 COHRE partnered with several other organisations, including
the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), to draft the report and ultimately
defend the residents.8 The Community Law Centre, a public-interest research
and advocacy group based at the University of the Western Cape, joined
COHRE and CALS in filing amicus curiae briefs in support of the residents.9
The High Court focused exclusively on the section 26 arguments and, citing
the Constitutional Court's first housing rights case, Government of the Republic
of South Africa v Grootboom,10 held that the City had failed to meet its obliga-
tions to create and implement a plan that would 'foster conditions to enable
3 For a description of the regeneration plan and the practice of forced evictions, see Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Any Room for the Poor? Forced Evictions in
Johannesburg, South Africa, 8 March 2005, at 41-6 and 60-4, available at:www.cohre.org/
view-page.php?pageid=120 [last accessed 20 August 2008].
4 No. 103 of 1977, section 12(4)(b). See generally, Chenwi, Advancing the Right to Adequate
Housing of Desperately Poor People: City of Johannesburg v. Rand Properties, (2006) 14
Human Rights Brief13; and COHRE, supra n. 3 at 38-9.
5 City of Johannesburg High Court, supra n. 2 at para. 11.7.
6 Ibid.
7 COHRE, supra n. 3.
8 Ibid. at 5, n. 1. See also COHRE/CALS, Media Release, 'Jo-Burg City Housing Policy Goes
to Bloemfontein', 2 February 2007, which states: 'The plight of [the residents] was first
brought to public attention in a May 2005 report co-authored by researchers from the
Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and COHRE, available at: http://www.cohre.org/
view.page.php?page.id=290 [last accessed 20 August 2008].
9 Ibid. which states: 'The Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and the
Community Law Centre (CLC) have been permitted to make submissions [to the SCA] as
friends of the court.'
10 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
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the Respondents to have access to adequate housing in the inner city'
11
The Court then ordered the City to develop and implement a 'programme to
progressively realise the right to adequate housing to people in the inner city
of Johannesburg', and enjoined the City from evicting the residents.
1 2
The residents' victory had an immediate impact. Despite appealing the judg-
ment to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the City not only ceased its
attempts to evict the residents who were party to the suit, but also put the
entire inner-city eviction programme on hold.
13
The SCA reversed the high court's judgment. The SCA held that the evictions
were constitutional, but that the City had an obligation to provide the evicted
residents with temporary housing consistent with recently passed national
housing legislation.1 4 The SCA also found that the temporary accommodations
must be within the municipal region but not the inner-city district, as
requested by the residents and ordered by the High Court.
15
The residents appealed the SCAS order to the Constitutional Court, which
accepted the application in May 2007.16 The Court heard oral argument on
28 August 2007 and two days later issued an interim order. The order required
the parties to 'engage with each other meaningfully.., in an effort to resolve
the differences and difficulties aired in this application in light of the values
of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality
and the rights and duties of the citizens concerned'.17 It also required that the
parties file affidavits reporting the results of the negotiations with the Court
approximately one month later, on 3 October 2007.18
Just shy of the deadline, the parties filed affidavits with the Court outlining
a remarkable settlement of most of the issues in the case. Among other
things, the settlement requires the City to make the existing buildings safer
and more habitable by cleaning the buildings and providing sanitation ser-
vices, access to water and functioning toilets.19 Before relocating the residents
from the buildings designated for redevelopment, the City agreed to refur-
bish several other buildings in inner-city Johannesburg to at least provide
11 City of Johannesburg High Court, supra n. 2 at para. 66.
12 Ibid. at Order, paras 3-4.
13 COHRE/CALS, Media Release, supra n. 8, which states: 'In light of the High Court's judgment,
the City appears to have suspended its mass eviction program.
14 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd, 2007 SCA 25 (RSA), at para. 78 (City of
Johannesburg SCA).
15 Ibid. at paras 75 and 77.
16 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City
of Johannesburg, Case No. 24/07, Interim Order, 30 August 2007, available at: http://www.con-
stitutionalcourt.org.za using search terms 'City of Johannesburg' [last accessed 24 August
2008].
17 Ibid. at para. 1.
18 Ibid. at para. 3.
19 Settlement agreement between City of Johannesburg and the Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road,
Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg, 29 October 2007, at paras 2-4 (City of
Johannesburg partial settlement), copy on file with the author.
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'security against eviction; access to sanitation; access to potable water; access
to electricity for heating, lighting and cooking' 20 and to limit any rental fees
to no more than 25% of the occupants' monthly income.21 The City also
agreed to consult with the residents on the 'provision of suitable permanent
housing solutions.., having regard to applicable national, provincial and
municipal housing policies'.
22
The Constitutional Court delivered its final opinion and order on 19 February
2008. The Court approved the parties' settlement but specifically refused to
deal with the residents' broader claim that the City still lacked a comprehensive
housing plan as required by Grootboom. Instead, the Court focused on the process
that had resulted in the settlement and found that 'there is every reason to believe
that negotiations will continue in good faith' including negotiations over perma-
nent housing for the residents as part of a broader housing plan.23 The Court
noted that the City's position had evolved considerably throughout the litigation
as demonstrated by the City's 'willingness to engage' and expressed optimism
that 'there is no reason to think that future engagement will not be meaningful
and will not lead to a reasonable result'"24 But the Court was also careful
to emphasise that judicial intervention remains an enforcement option 'if this
course becomes necessary
25
The Court then formalised the negotiation requirement that it had imposed
on the parties in this case. The Court adopted the term 'engagement' to describe
this requirement and spent 14 paragraphs of this 54-paragraph judgment
explaining the need for engagement among the government, affected citizens
and civil society organisations to develop effective policies for implementing
the socioeconomic rights provisions in the Constitution.
The Court first situated the engagement requirement in its earlier cases,
citing as examples the disappointment it had expressed in Grootboom over the
City of Cape Town's failure to deal on a case-by-case basis with the problems
faced by the Grootboom residents and also its call for 'respectful face-to-face
engagement or mediation' in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.
26
The Court emphasised that 'engagement has the potential to contribute
towards the resolution of disputes and to increased understanding and sympa-
thetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the process.
27
The Court found that a range of constitutional provisions, most importantly
the right to human dignity and the right to life, require that the government
20 Ibid. at para. 6.
21 Ibid. at para. 7
22 Ibid. at para. 18.
23 City of Johannesburg Constitutional Court, supra n. 1 at para. 34.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). See City of Johannesburg Constitutional Court, supra n. 1 at paras 10-12.
27 City of Johannesburg Constitutional Court, supra n. 1 at para. 15.
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'meaningfully engage' with citizens affected by its policies. 28 The Court empha-
sised that, in most instances, engagement must be more then a merely
'ad hoc' process and instead any broad redevelopment planning effort must
incorporate engagement from the start.29 The Court also recognised that
'people about to be evicted may be so vulnerable that they may not be able to
understand the importance of engagement and may refuse to take part in the
process'. In those circumstances, the State must still work to establish
a meaningful engagement process. The Court emphasised that civil society
has a significant role representing the interests of such persons: 'Civil society
organizations that support the peoples' claims should preferably facilitate the
engagement process in every possible way.
3 1
Finally, the Court established what amounts to a public reporting require-
ment for the government following any engagement process. Emphasising
that 'secrecy is counter-productive to engagement, the Court stated that, at
least for municipal eviction proceedings, 'the provision of a complete and accu-
rate account of the engagement process including at least the reasonable
efforts of the municipality with that process would ordinarily be essential.
32
Courts are then required to consider 'whether there had been meaningful
engagement between a city and the resident about to be rendered homeless',
when considering a challenge under section 26.
2. Proceduralisation with Remedial Bite
Many outside of South Africa have suggested that the relatively restrained
approach to socioeconomic rights the Constitutional Court has developed to
date strikes the correct balance between court enforcement and deference to
legislative and executive policy judgments. The Court's first housing-rights
case, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,34 is the most cele-
brated example of this restraint. In Grootboom, the Court declared provincial
and national housing policies unconstitutional, but limited its relief to a
declaration with no specific guidance on how to remedy the defect. It also
refused to retain jurisdiction to ensure government compliance. Minister of
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2), decided in
2002 where the Court ordered extension of a specific drug programme and
28 Ibid. at para. 16.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. at para. 15.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. at para. 21.
33 Ibid.
34 Supra n. 10.
35 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
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also Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others,36 decided
in 2003, where it ordered extension of social security benefits to permanent
residents, are viewed as slightly stronger interventions but still relatively
restrained in that the Court avoided broad interpretations of the rights at
issue and continued to refuse to engage in direct oversight.
Grootboom has been described variously as a 'dialogic
37 or a 'weak-form' 38
or an 'administrative-law' 39 approach. These labels all highlight the Court's
reluctance to engage directly in policy development, preferring to give broad
discretion to the political branches while still indirectly enforcing these
rights. For that same reason, critics of the Court's approach in Grootboom
and these other early cases have charged it with proceduralising these rights
by refusing to give them any substantive content.
40
The Court's orders in City of Johannesburg demonstrate that it is firmly com-
mitted to leaving policy development in the hands of the political branches.
Faced with consistent rulings at both the High Court and SCA levels ordering
direct relief against the City of Johannesburg, the Court attempted one more
time to force the parties to come up with their own solution to the apparent
section 26 violations. In its final order, the Court then made the process that
resulted in this remarkable settlement, a constitutional requirement in all
eviction cases.
On first glance, this refusal to engage with the substance of section 26
appears to fulfil the worst fears of the Court's critics that these rights will
become nothing more than 'good-government' standards without substantive
content or effect.41 But the engagement process also offers the promise of
something more than the Court's earlier cases. By forcing government officials
to pay attention to section 26 on a consistent basis, even absent existing litiga-
tion, and also by recognising civil society's constitutional role in advocating
for housing policy development, engagement may represent a powerful and
innovative mechanism for enforcing socioeconomic rights.
On the one hand, the engagement requirement looks much like Grootboom.
Like the declaration in that case, engagement gives the political branches
36 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).
37 Dixon, 'Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form Judicial
Review Revisited, (2007) 5 International Constitutional Law Journal 391 at 417, argues that
the Court should adopt a 'dialogic model, which is 'fully consistent with the approach the
Court in TAC suggested might be appropriate in future cases'.
38 Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 231-7.
39 Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
at 234, states: 'What the South African Constitutional Court has basically done is to adopt
an administrative law model of socioeconomic rights' (emphasis added)
40 Brand, 'The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence', in
Botha et al. (eds), Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: Sun
Media, 2003) 33 at 41, describes the Court's approach as 'limited'.
41 Ibid. at 49.
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control over what benefits to offer under section 26, thus giving them the
power to determine the substantive content of the housing right. In this way,
engagement avoids court-directed policy making, at least at the outset, while
still requiring specific attention to section 26's requirements.
But other aspects of engagement offer a stronger remedial 'bite'. Under this
new engagement requirement, local governments seeking to evict residents
for any reason must now develop a process for consulting those residents.
To be 'meaningful', as the Court requires, that process must offer real opportu-
nity for negotiating a mutually acceptable solution that respects the right
to adequate housing under section 26. Civil society groups are specifically
empowered to act as facilitators in this process, thus expanding the range
of perspectives and enhancing the residents' bargaining power.
At its best, engagement will avoid the need for court involvement altogether.
Over the short term, the municipality will be able to proceed, perhaps with
some modifications to accommodate the residents, with whatever eviction
plan it adopts. The displaced residents will be provided with some form of
housing that may be, as was the case in City of Johannesburg, superior to the
housing they give up.
In the long term, the engagement requirement can create incentives for gov-
ernment to develop the kind of multi-faceted and robust housing policies that
section 26 arguably requires. The individual negotiations that engagement
requires will presumably inform the content of any broader policies, and the
results of these individual accommodations will form the basis for modifying
that strategy over time.
Thus, engagement appears to have two, somewhat contradictory, effects.
Engagement potentially diminishes the judiciary's interpretive role while,
at the same time, enhancing its remedial authority. The Constitutional
Court went to great lengths to avoid giving any specific content to the housing
right itself in City of Johannesburg. This represents in many respects a retrench-
ment from Grootboom, where the Court was willing to find that section 26, at
a minimum, requires a plan for addressing the emergency needs of homeless
communities. The Court stopped short of defining what content such a plan
must include, but did, at least, identify emergency needs as a substantive
aspect of section 26.
City of Johannesburg, in contrast, lapses almost completely into a procedural
analysis and finds the City's eviction procedures lacking because the City
failed to engage with residents before attempting eviction, not because it
lacked a constitutionally adequate housing plan, as the residents claimed.
While Grootboom's emergency-needs requirement was part of the basis for
questioning that procedural failure, the Court deliberately avoided further
elaboration of section 26's content. The Court thus appears to be moving
more firmly into a role that avoids direct interpretation at all costs, rather
than, as in other weak-form models, providing contingent interpretations
710 HRLR 8 (2008), 703-713
that are subject to revision by the executive or legislature. This potentially
weakens its interpretive authority even further than in earlier cases.
At the same time that the failure to give substantive content to section 26
represents a relinquishing of interpretive authority, however, the engagement
requirement also represents a stronger remedy because the Court is now
requiring municipalities to develop what is in effect a prospective report for
court review of its engagement efforts. The genius of this structure is that it
creates some of the benefits of a structural injunction because the government
must now consider what a court's response will be in the same way that it
would if it were operating under a consent decree but the court does not actu-
ally retain jurisdiction. Instead, the reporting function will come into play
only in subsequent litigation. While that removes the immediacy of an injunc-
tion, it also broadens the effect because the City must create a broad-based
reporting procedure and apply it in all cases, not just those that would be
directly subject to an injunction.
This remedial 'ratcheting up' falls somewhere in between a declaration of
unconstitutionality, to which the Court limited itself in Grootboom, and direct
judicial enforcement of section 26. This is so because engagement requires gov-
ernment action but does not mandate implementation of a particular substan-
tive programme. Engagement is also a remedial enhancement in the sense
that it at least implies an individually enforceable right, something that
Grootboom expressly rejected. Again, the right is not to a particular service or
level of benefit but to a procedure, thus avoiding a court-prescribed policy. But
that procedure is plainly intended to result in specific benefits, at least in the
form of retaining access to existing shelter, but more likely, as was the case in
City of Johannesburg, some improved accommodation and a reasonable prospect
for long-term access to permanent housing.
This aspect of engagement in particular makes the remedy at once more
immediate, and, at the same time, avoids the problem of queue-jumping with
which the Court was so concerned in previous cases.4 2 While residents whom
a municipality seeks to evict will be the immediate beneficiaries of whatever
accommodation results from engagement, the municipality controls that
choice, and, presumably, will expend resources in engagement and accommo-
dation only after deciding that broader policy goals will be served by targeting
one community over another.
The engagement requirement also should force municipalities to incorpo-
rate housing needs as part of any long-term development strategy because
42 See, for example, Grootboom, supra n. 10 at para. 92, where the Court states: 'This judgment
must not be understood as approving any practice of land invasion for the purpose of coer-
cing a state structure into providing housing on a preferential basis to those who participate
in any exercise of this kind. Land invasion is inimical to the systematic provision of adequate
housing on a planned basis:
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they will not be able to evict anyone without such a plan in place. The Court
explicitly emphasised this aspect when it rejected the City's claim that it
would be impractical to expect meaningful engagement in every eviction case
in inner-city Johannesburg.43 The Court also noted that smaller municipalities
may be able to engage with residents on only an ad hoc basis, but large cities
require a long-term strategy for 'structured, consistent and careful
engagement'.
44
Viewed this way, engagement starts to look a lot more robust than even
Grootboom, which mandated a particular shift in housing policy but put no
short-term procedure in place for ensuring a prompt response. Engagement
stands as a background requirement, potentially, but not immediately, enforce-
able by the courts. This removes the courts from direct policy development
but gives them enhanced remedial power because municipalities face the
prospect of defending not only the ultimate substantive policy they develop
but also the process through which they implement that policy.
Rather than creating a dialogue between courts and these municipalities in
the sense that both sides offer a series of interpretations and reinterpretations
of the right itself, engagement really creates a mechanism for requiring
those municipalities to pay consistent attention to the right to housing and
to develop plans that address the housing crisis. While focused on evictions
specifically, this mechanism has potentially broader effects. Whenever govern-
ment at any level desires to implement redevelopment policies that may involve
displacement it must engage with them and interested civil society groups.
Mark Tushnet notes that what gives rights a'feeling' of strength or weakness
depends to a large degree on the extent to which such rights generate distinc-
tive political claims.45 By this definition, engagement feels relatively stronger
than the declaration in Grootboom precisely because it puts in place the
enforcement mechanism just described. Those political claims are strength-
ened because the Court explicitly extended them beyond citizens whom muni-
cipalities seek to evict to civil society groups involved in housing advocacy.
While engagement will work most directly in the context of a proposed evic-
tion, the Court's recognition of the constitutional role that civil society will
play in that context strengthens their hand in the larger policy development
process. Municipalities now know that they must consult these groups when-
ever they seek to evict and must seriously consider what those groups think
section 26 requires. Thus, it makes sense for those same municipalities to take
seriously those groups' views when developing housing policy more generally.
The specific role for civil society groups that the Court recognises also helps
alleviate concerns that the Court's refusal to enforce these rights directly
43 City of Johannesburg, supra n. 1 at para. 19.
44 Ibid.
45 Tushnet, supra n. 38 at 251.
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means that only those individuals who can gain access to the legal assistance
of the kind afforded to the City of Johannesburg plaintiffs will benefit. Tushnet
points out that, to be an effective substitute for direct court enforcement, civil
society groups must gain domestic legitimacy.46 The Court's direct recognition
goes a long way towards establishing that legitimacy, not only in broader
society but also with the political branches, which must now deal with these
groups consistently over time.
Rather than dialogue in the sense that term is typically understood, in
the form of a conversation between courts and the political branches, then,
engagement forefronts the interaction among civil society, citizens and the
government. The courts play only a supporting role.
3. Conclusion
City of Johannesburg represents an important new development in the
Constitutional Court's approach to enforcement of socio-economic rights. On
the one hand, it appears to confirm predictions by the Court's critics that it is
proceduralising these rights. But, at the same time, engagement offers a novel
and potentially more powerful tool for enforcement through proceduralisation
that those critics failed to anticipate. Accordingly, City of Johannesburg can be
read as signalling a continued willingness by the Court to give the government
not only broad leeway in policy development but also an increasing impatience
over the pace of that development and the level of commitment to implementa-
tion of these rights.
It is far too early to predict precisely how (and whether) municipalities and
other levels of government involved in housing policy will attempt to comply
with this new engagement requirement. It is likely, however, that engagement
will have several important effects over the short term. First, engagement
should strengthen the role of civil society groups both by heightening their
profile with the executive during the policy development process and by
increasing their leverage when particular disputes arise.
Second, lower courts now have a broader role to play when dealing with
housing policy disputes. This is because courts are now specifically empowered
to review the entire process that led up to the dispute, including to what
extent the government responded to City of Johannesburg by developing
a mechanism for engaging citizens affected by their policies.
Finally, there is good reason to expect that the Constitutional Court might
extend the engagement requirement to situations beyond eviction. The
Witwatersrand High Court's recent water-rights decision is a scenario ripe
46 Ibid. at 253.
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for such an extension.47 In that decision, the High Court ruled that the City of
Johannesburg's practice of forced installation of pre-payment water meters
in Phiri (one of the oldest townships of Soweto) was unconstitutional and
ordered the City to provide residents of Phiri with 50 litres of free basic
water per person per day, setting aside the City's decision to limit free water to
25 litres per person per day.4 8 Key to the court's judgment was a finding
that the City implemented its prepayment meter policy without any meaning-
ful consultation with the affected residents.4 9 It is conceivable that the
Constitutional Court, which is required under the Constitution to affirm
the order, might instead order the City to return to the bargaining table to
engage further with the Phiri residents rather than merely affirming the
specific water policy crafted by the High Court. Doing so would confirm the
Court's move towards a procedural approach to enforcement to the disappoint-
ment of its critics but would also open the door to extending the remedial
'bite' of engagement to the other socioeconomic rights in the South African
Constitution.
47 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, Case No. 06/13865, 30 April 2008,
(Witwatersrand Local Division). available at: http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=
outputdetails.asp%3FRID%3D1454%260TID%3D5%26PID%3D45 [last accessed 24 August
2008.
48 Ibid. at para. 183.
49 Ibid. at para. 122.
